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Abstract. We propose a new coding scheme for multimedia finger-
printing resistant to noise. Our scheme is based on signature codes for
weighted noisy adder channel. The scheme (codes) can trace the entire
coalition of pirates and provides significantly better rate than previously
known fingerprinting schemes. We also establish a relationship between
these two problems and the compressed sensing problem.
1 Introduction
There are the following well established concepts of digital fingerprint-
ing codes known as tracing traitors [1] or codes with the identifiable par-
ent property [2], and digital fingerprinting codes [3],[4], dealing with the
problem of protection against unauthorized copying of discrete data. A
theoretical model for data protection of continuous data was proposed
in [5] and [6]. The corresponding codes, called multimedia fingerprint-
ing codes, were investigated in [5] - [11]. First multimedia fingerprinting
codes with nonvanishing rate, namely with the rate of order t−2, where
t is the coalition’s size, were constructed in our paper [12]. Generaliza-
tions of results from [12] to the case of presence of noise was done in [13].
All previous considerations of multimedia fingerprinting codes were based
on some discretisation, introduced in [5], i.e., only hard decoding of such
codes was investigated. In this paper we consider the output of the corre-
sponding channel without discretisation, i.e. we consider soft decoding of
multimedia fingerprinting codes. We show that the corresponding model
of multimedia fingerprinting channel without discretisation is equivalent
to some modification of some model of the adder channel, considered
in [14], which we call weighted adder channel. And signature codes for
the weighted real adder channel can be considered as multimedia finger-
printing codes with soft decoding. We show that the rate of multimedia
fingerprinting codes with soft decoding is at least 1/t what is much larger
than for the hard decoding which rate cannot exceed O(t−2 log t) even for
the noiseless case, see [12].
2 Channel model of multimedia fingerprinting
Consider, following [5], [6], multimedia content being represented as a
real-valued vector x ∈ Rm, called the host signal. To prevent unauthorized
redistribution of x, the dealer constructs a set of digital fingerprints using
a linear modulation scheme that employs n noise-like orthonormal signals
(vectors) {fi ∈ Rm | i = 1, . . . , n, n ≤ m}. The fingerprint wj of the j−th
user (j ∈ {1, . . . ,M}) is represented as follows:
wj =
n∑
i=1
hijfi, (1)
where hij ∈ {+1,−1} if for antipodal signals and hij ∈ {0, 1} for on-
off keying type of modulation. Below we consider the case on-off keying
type of modulation. The sets of fingerprints {wj} will be called a finger-
printing code. Equivalently and more convenient is to consider the set of
n-dimensional binary vectors hj = (h1j , . . . , hnj) as binary multimedia
fingerprinting code of length n, cardinality M and rate R = n−1 log2M .
The dealer distributes to the j-th user the vector
yj = x+wj ,
where one assumes that ‖x‖2  ‖wj‖2 in order to be sure that the finger-
printing scheme do not introduce significant changes in the host signal.
A group of users, called colluders or pirates, aims to create an unautho-
rized copy of the contents such that the dealer cannot trace its origins to
any of them. An important concept in digital fingerprinting, the Marking
Assumption of [3], in the context of multimedia fingerprinting can be ex-
pressed in the following way: we assume that the members of the pirate
coalition J ⊂ {1, . . . ,M} cannot manipulate individual signals fj , and
are limited to linear attacks. By a linear attack we mean that pirates can
generate a forged copy yˆ of the host content only as a linear combination
of their copies yj with some coefficients λj
yˆ =
∑
j∈J
λjyj (2)
where λj > 0 for all j and
∑
j∈J λj = 1. Hence
yˆ = x+
∑
j∈J
λjwj . (3)
The dealer calculates the vector S = S(J, {λj}) = (s1, . . . , sn), where
sk = (ŷ − x, fk) = 〈
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈J
λjhijfi, fk〉 =
∑
j∈J
λjhkj (4)
and 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product. Equivalently,
S =
∑
j∈J
λjhj , (5)
where hj = (h1j , . . . , hnj). It was suggested in [5], [6] to consider the
following discretisation, when the dealer knows only whether sk = 0, or
sk = 1, or that 0 < sk < 1, but does not know the value of sk in the last
case. Note, that sk = 0 means that hkj = 0 for all j ∈ J , sk = 1 means
that hkj = 1 for all j ∈ J and finally 0 < sk < 1 means that
{∪j∈Jhkj} = {0, 1} (6)
It means that the dealer observes ternary output, i.e., the output of the 2-
frequency noiseless multiple-access channel without intensity information
[15] (the A-channel, for short), see more detailed explanation in the next
section. This approach to constructing multimedia fingerprinting codes
as signature codes for the A-channel was developed in [12].
In almost all previous works on multimedia fingerprinting codes it was
assumed that the dealer observes the forged copy yˆ without noise. This
simplified assumption is not very realistic. Indeed, there are at least two
sources of noise: a measurement noise, and a malicious noise, produced by
the coalition. Therefore we assume that the dealer observes the following
vector as a result of coalition forgery
z = x+
∑
j∈J
λjwj +E, (7)
where E = (E1, . . . , Em) and let for simplicity Ei be i.i.d.r.v. Similarly to
(4) and (5) the dealer evaluates
sk(E) = (ẑ− x, fk)
and the following vector
S(E) = (s1(E), . . . , sn(E)) =
∑
j∈J
λjhj + e, (8)
where e = (e1, . . . , en) and ek = 〈E, fk〉. Based on the known value of
the vector S(E) the dealer tries to reveal (to trace) the whole coalition,
which produced this forgery, or at least one of its members. We shall con-
sider S(E) as the output of continuous multimedia fingerprinting channel
which is in fact a modification of well known adder channel with noise.
We call this channel as weighted adder channel. Indeed, equation (8) with
λj ≡ 1 and e = 0 describes the output of the adder channel with binary
input in the case of t active users among M , and λj plays the role of
weights. We show that multimedia fingerprinting codes capable to trace
the whole coalition of size t are in fact the same as t-signature code for
the weighted adder channel, and the number of users M equals to the
cardinality of the corresponding signature code. Note that an intermedi-
ate case of the weighted adder channel λj > 0 was firstly considered in
[14] (where weights λj were called gains) but consideration of noise was
restricted in [14] to the very particular case e = b1, where b is a real
number. Finally, we establish a relationship between the weighted adder
channel and the compressed sensing problem [16],[17].
3 Codes for noiseless weighted adder channel
Recall that the dealer observes the output of the following multiple-access
channel, which we called the weighted adder channel (WAC, for short),
see (8), with unknown weights λj and unknown set J of active users
of WAC,i.e., the set of traitors. The dealer goal is to find the set J ,
what corresponds to zero-error coding for multiple-access channel (MAC)
with partial activity, i.e. not all possible users of MAC are active, but
not more than t of them. We shall consider the set of n-dimensional
binary vectors hj = (h1j , . . . , hnj) as a binary multimedia fingerprinting
code of cardinality M capable to find any set of t or less traitors in the
case of s noiseless WAC iff for any subsets J, J ′ ⊂ {1, . . . ,M} such that
|J | ≤ t, |J ′| ≤ t the following equality∑
j∈J
λjhj =
∑
j∈J ′
λ′jhj (9)
implies that J = J ′ (and λj = λ′j for all j).
It’s easy to see that this condition is equivalent to the linear inde-
pendence (over real numbers) of any 2t vectors hj . Such effective set of
vectors is well known in coding theory as columns of a parity-check ma-
trix of a binary BCH code of length M and redundancy n, correcting t
errors. Indeed, any 2t columns are linear independent over the field of
residues by module 2, and hence they are independent over the rational
numbers and also over the real numbers since in all cases dependency
means that the determinant of the corresponding t × t minor equals to
0. It is not clear if this construction is even weakly optimal, i.e., has the
minimal possible order of n as a function of M - for binary BCH-codes it
gives n = t log2M(1 + o(1)). Anyway we see that in the case of absence
of quantization, i.e. soft decision, the rate of the best multimedia finger-
printing code is at least 1/t whereas for hard decoding the rate of any
multimedia fingerprinting code is O(t−2 log t) [12].
4 Codes for noisy weighted adder channel and the
compressed sensing problem
Now we want to construct codes which are capable to recover a set J by
its “syndrom” S(E) =
∑
j∈J λjhj + e, see equation (8).
It is very similar to the compressed sensing problem, see [16],[17], with
the only three differences:
for “weakly” multimedia fingerprinting code it is sufficient to find at least
one j ∈ J for sure;
for multimedia fingerprinting we need to find only the “error” set J , and
solution of compressed sending problem means to find J and values λj ;
vectors hj are binary.
Consider slightly other statement of the problem, more in the spirit of
coding theory, namley, that the number of errors is limited, i.e., wt(e) ≤
T . A solution of this problem was given in [18], see also [19]. If to omit
details (which can be found in [18]) then in order to correct T syndrom’s
errors one should “add” T log(t logM) redundant symbols what gives the
total redundancy n = t log2M + T log2 log2M + T log2 t. It is easy to
check that for T − const it keeps the same order of rate, namely R =
t−1(1 + o(1)). Note that a similar technique was used in [20].
5 Conclusion
Let us note in conclusion that the problem of noise in multiple-access
channels was almost ignored probably because of the following remark in
[15] “A more sophisticated model taking such errors into account could
easily be developed. One method would be to use a noisy channel in
cascade with our noiseless channel. It is our contention, however, that
although the details are different, the basic ideas are the same in the
noisy and noiseless cases.” Our construction is much better than such
simple cascade.
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